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Networks and networking have become catch-words in regional science, and particular ly in regional 
and urban geography in the last decade: we speak about network firms, network society, network 
economy but also network cities, city-networks, reti urbane, reseaux de villes. Mere catch-words for 
someone; a true new scientific paradigm according to others. In our view fact we are facing a new 
paradigm in spatial sciences, subject to some precise conditions: 
- that its exact meaning is thoroughly defined, 
- that its theoretical economic rationale is justified, 
- that the novelty of its empirical content is clearly pointed  out, with respect to more traditional 
spatial facts and processes that can easily be interpreted through existing spatial paradigms. 
The theoretical building blocks the network concept or paradigm may be constructed upon are: 
- a new view of the economy as a system or web of links between individuals, firms and institutions, 
where links depend on experience and evolve through learning processes; the existing endowment of 
knowledge and other production factors is put into value through a relational capability addressed 
towards the exchange and collection of information, building reputation and trust, creating synergies, 
cutting down uncertainty, boosting learning processes; 
- the acknowledgement of cooperation as a new organisational and behavioural form, intermediate 
between hierarchy (internal development and merging of external activities through direct control) 
and market resort; cooperation networks among firms collaborating with each other on technological 
advances and innovation projects were the earlier phenomenon that was well explored in the past. 
In a spatial perspective, two issues are particularly worth exploring through the network concept: 
- networking as cooperation among individuals, firms and institutions taking place inside the cities 
concerning collective action, public/private partnerships on large urban projects and the supply of 
public goods, and giving rise to new forms of urban governance; 
- networking as inter-urban cooperation, assuming the cities as economic actors, competing but also 
cooperating  in  the  global  arena  where  locations  of  internationally mobile  factors  (professionals, 
corporations, institutions) are decided and negotiated. 
The paper is organised in the following way: 
-  a  major  section  is  devoted  to  the  interpretation  of  the  micro-economic  efficiency  of  local 
networking (local urban networks), in terms of the usual criteria of optimal allocation of resources 
and collective welfare, viewing the network as an organisational alternative between market failure 
and state failure; 
-  a  transition  section  deals  with  the  interpretation  of  cities,  a  collective  actor  at  best,  as 
individual/unitary economic actors, given the case for collective action among interest groups, the 
possibility of defining in broad  terms a function of collective preference referring to non-mobile 
local actors,  the engagement of public  and  private  actors in  processes  of strategic planning  and 
definition of shared visions for the future of the city vis-a-vis mobile actors; 
-  another main  section  interprets  competition  and  cooperation among  cities (inter-city-networks) 
underlining advantages, risks and conditions for maximising overall comprehensive well-being. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION:  A  GLOBAL  ECONOMY  CENTRED  ON  LINKAGES  AND  CO-
OPERATION 
 
Networks and networking have become very fashionable concepts and terms in regional science, and 
in particular in regional and urban geography in the last decade: we speak about  network firms, 
network society, network economy but also network cities, city -networks, “ reti urbane” , “ réseaux de 
villes” . Only catch-words for somebody; a true new scientific paradigm according to others. 
 
The opinion  of  these  authors  is that  in  fact we  are  confronted  with  a  new  paradigm  in  spatial 
sciences, under some precise conditions: 
-  that its exact meaning is thoroughly defined, 
-  that its theoretical economic rationale is justified, 
-  that the novelty of its empirical content is clearly pointed out, with respect to more traditional 
spatial facts and processes that can easily be interpreted through existing spatial paradigms. 
 
In fact, starting from the third condition, the concept of spatial networks is sometimes utilised merely 
as a substitute for “ interaction” : exchange of goods, services, information, contacts among places and 
nodes. In this case, the traditional paradigm (and related  models) of spatial interaction can be easily 
utilised, unless one could demonstrate that probability of such exchanges is widely independent from 
distance and size of nodes. 
 
If interaction is underlined by research works interested in the “ space of flows” , studies oriented 
towards the description of the “space of places”  often use the  network concept as a synonym (or an 
explanation) for polycentricism, a merely geographical and descriptive concept. 
 
Sometimes the same term is used to identify social linkages that characterize local communities or 
associations kept together by ethnic, linguistic, civic or even criminal goals. While in this case the 
micro-foundations of these phenomena are studied by  other disciplines, like sociology or political 
science,  their spatial  effects  may  well  be  interpreted  through other  existing  concepts  of  a  more 
“ macro”  nature like that of social capital. 
 
Finally, sometimes the term “network”  is used to interpret relations and flows that take place within 
an urban hierarchy, among centres of different hierarchical level. Also in this case, we do not need a 
new concept for identifying well-known phenomena, unless interactions take place among centres 
belonging to the same hierarchical level, which are supposed to entertain no relationship with each 
other by the standard central place model. 
 
On the other hand, there exist other phenomena that cannot be interpreted through the usual tools –  
some of which were indicated before –  for which the new concept could be of use: spatial interaction 
taking place irrespective to distance, for selected and targeted goals; relationships between centres of 
the same size and level, performing the same tasks and functions on the territory; linkages among 
local  actors  giving  rise  to  a  network  surplus  as  a  consequence  of  synergies  and  cooperation; 
spontaneous or organised division of labour among centres in a regional context. 
 
The  relevant  theoretical  building  block  on  which  the  network  concept  or  paradigm  may  be 
constructed are: 
-  a  new  view  of  the  economy  as  a  system  or  web  of  links between  individuals,  firms  and 
institutions, where links depend on experience and evolve through learning processes (Kirman, 
1997;  Malecki, Oinas,  1999).  The existing  endowment of  knowledge and  other production 
factors is put into value through a relational capability addressed towards the exchange and 
collection  of  information,  building  reputation  and  trust,  creating  synergies,  cutting  down 
uncertainty, boosting learning processes (Hayek, ...).; NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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-  the  acknowledgement  of  cooperation  as  a  new  organisational  and  behavioural  form, 
intermediate  between  hierarchy  (internal  development  and  merging  of  external  activities 
through  direct  control)  and  market  resort,  following  the  well-known  works  of  Coase  and 
Williamson. Cooperation networks among firms collaborating with each other on technological 
advances and innovation projects were the earlier phenomena that were abundantly explored in 
the past. 
 
At  the  same  time,  political  experiences  of  vertical  and  horizontal  subsidiarity,  i.e. 
federalism/devolution and privatization/liberalization, leading to a shrinking role of the nation state, 
are getting widespread.  Within a context of  diffusion of  power, cooperation through networking 
(among  local  stakeholders,  among  government  tiers,  among  cities)  may  then  be  an  efficient 
alternative also to the State. 
 
In a spatial perspective, two phenomena in particular are worth exploring today through the network 
concept: 
-  networking as cooperation among individuals, firms and institutions taking place inside the 
cities concerning collective action, public/private partnerships on large urban projects and the 
supply of public goods, and giving rise to new forms of urban governance; 
-  networking as inter-urban cooperation, assuming the cities as economic actors, competing but 
also  cooperating  in  the  global  arena  where  locations  of  internationally  mobile  factors 
(professionals, corporations, institutions) are decided and negotiated. 
 
The paradigm of city-networks, complementary to the traditional one of urban hierarchy, initially 
proposed by the Southern European tradition of spatial analysis, has gained interest and support in 
other scientific and policy contexts. Recently it was supported by  the EU spatial strategy document, 
the ESDP (Glasgow and Potsdam drafts) in the specification given by one of the present authors, 
namely that of complementarity and synergy city-networks (Camagni, 1993). 
 
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 is devoted to the interpretation of the micro -
economic  efficiency  of  local  networking,  in terms  of  the  usual  criteria of  optimal  allocation  of 
resources and collective welfare. Section 3 deals with the  interpretation of cities as economic actors, 
given the case for collective action among interest groups, the possibility of defining in broad terms a 
function of collective preference referring to non-mobile local actors, the engagement of public and 
private actors in processes of strategic planning and definition of shared  visions for the future of the 
city. Section 4  interprets  competition and cooperation among cities (“ city-networks” ) underlining 
advantages, risks and conditions for maximising overall comprehensive well-being. 
 
 
2. MICRO-ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF (LOCAL) NETWORKS 
 
2.1. Between market failure and state failure 
 
A well-known result of economic analysis is that limited resources are put to their best use, in terms 
of welfare (“ utility” ) generated for the whole of society, when all of them are allocated by means of a 
perfectly competitive market mechanism working through price signals. However, this is so only 
provided some conditions are satisfied; if they are not, the risk of market failure materialises. 
 
A further result is that the issues of allocative efficiency and distributive equity can be dealt with 
separately, giving rise to separate justifications for non-market action when optimum conditions are 
not  satisfied.  Finally,  whatever  is  the  justification  for  government  intervention,  whether  for 
efficiency or for equity, economic analysis is also able to identify the conditions to be satisfied for its 
success. When these conditions are  not met, the risk of state failure materialises;  networks may then 
be viewed as an institutional arrangement avoiding both risks. NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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2.1.1. Market failure 
 
When the market mechanism does not produce the desired result of efficient and effective use of 
limited resources, the reason  lies in the lack of one or more of three conditions. Their  lack provides 
the corresponding economic reasons for collective intervention, and the conseque nt guidelines to the 
appropriate type of intervention. The three conditions are: 
- no market power: not all actors in the market are price-takers –  on the contrary, some are able to 
influence  (“ make” )  prices,  thanks  to  their  relative  size  or  legal  privileges  (protection)  or  better 
knowledge of available opportunities (the effiquity condition); 
- no missing markets: information asymmetries, or externalities, or missing rights or public goods 
(the efficiency condition); 
- acceptable initial distribution of resources (health, education, ability to work, land, capital, other 
factors  of  production,  … )  hence  acceptable  market  outcomes,  i.e.  distribution  of  income  i.e. 
purchasing power (the equity condition). 
 
When  some  actors  enjoy  market  power,  a  perfect  competition  failure  occurs,  taking  one  of  the 
following forms: 
-  imperfectly  substitutable  products:  consumers  do  not  care  only  for  price  but  for  product 
characteristics and service quality as well –  but it may be argued that this is a matter of definition of 
the market and of willingness-to-pay for variety, rather than a market failure; 
-  long-run  imperfectly  mobile  (across  space  and  activities)  inputs  (capital,  labour,  …   incl. 
entrepreneurs) –  but it may be argued that mobility  is a matter of choice, trading off  income against 
location, so that immobility is the efficient response rather than a market failure; 
- non-price-taking firms e.g. strategic behaviour and/or collusion, or economies of scale and scope 
coupled with a limited extent of the market; calling for  market contestability (Demsetz) so that gains 
from competition outweigh private incentives to asymmetric positions. 
 
When information is incomplete or rights are not clearly assigned, a missing market failure may 
occur, taking one of the following forms: 
- uncertainty about future outcomes under risk aversion, to be compensated by risk premiums (higher 
rewards) or risk sharing (diversification), or by lowering the cost of collecting information; 
- hidden features, i.e. self-selection and adverse selection, where compulsory pooling may be an 
answer when ex ante equity considerations are at stake; 
- hidden action and moral hazard, i.e. conflict of goals between principal and agent, to be reconciled 
by appropriate incentives (partial refund, aid rationing  and auctioning, performance-related pay, … ) 
and by competition on the output and property markets (Arrow, 1985; Hart, Holmstrom, 1987); 
- externalities, i.e. uncompensated effects of transactions with social costs differing  from private 
costs, to be taken into account via a Pigouvian tax or a Coasian assignment of transferable rights, or 
via a merger of affected parties into a single decision-maker; 
-  non-rivalness  and/or  non-excludability  in  consumption,  and  provision  of  public  goods,  to  be 
financed  via  the  sale  of  collateral  private  goods,  via  club  creation,  or  via  taxation  and  public 
provision. 
In most of these cases, at least in principle, the market mechanism may generate modified rules of 
the  game  in  order  to  take these features  into  account,  albeit with a  cost  tag attached.  But  high 
transaction costs may prevent such rules to be agreed upon or to be credibly enforceable, so that 
often the state must step in and force command-and-control regulation or replace the market. 
 
When market outcomes  are not deemed equitable, an equity  failure occurs: what if the standard 
criterion for income, i.e. marginal productivity value, is evaluated as resulting into an unfairly low 
income? A traditional result of analysis  is that redistribution of resources can be separated  from, and 
occur prior to, market operations. In this context by resources we mean both income and property 
and, more basically, health and education. Redistribution may be seen as a sort of insurance policy NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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(“ safety net” ), but it must not destroy incentives to work, i.e. to economic growth. For this reason, 
especially in a long run perspective, some favour ex ante redistribution of resources via merit good 
provision over ex post redistribution of rewards via progressive direct taxation. Redistribution may 
even be beneficial to public goods demand; indeed, given its benefits, it may be seen as a public 
good itself (cohesion). 
 
Summing up, at least some types of market imperfection may not be left to take care for themselves, 
nor may all of these be simply subjected to some regulation engineering aiming at market solutions. 
 
2.1.2. State failure 
 
In the classical and neoclassical period, market was routinely preferred over state because of the 
costs imposed by the latter on freedom of choice, in broad terms. Although later on the state was 
deemed useful in remedying market  failures, in the last  half-century the efficiency costs of the state 
have also been discussed. From this viewpoint, government intervention  is also liable to failure with 
respect to the efficient and effective use of limited resources. 
 
As a matter of  fact, while costing the effects of market failures, we tended to forget that  state is not 
costless: for each public intervention we should ask ourselves whether social benefit exceeds state 
cost. The issue may well turn out to be an empirical one, but some general guidelines are available. 
 
In parallel to the three conditions for the success/failure of the market mechanism, one or more of the 
following three conditions may be lacking: 
- no side effects of state power (the effiquity condition); 
- no inability to deal with missing markets (the efficiency condition); 
- no, or worthwhile, efficiency costs of redistribution (the equity condition). 
 
First, when government intervention to check market power does not take the form of competition-
oriented market regulation, it is liable to fail in that it weakens or distorts incentives to efficiency: 
- nationalisation may generate X-inefficiency, due to the lack of economic incentives; 
- rate of return regulation may encourage capital over-intensity or cross-subsidies; 
-  mis-specification  of  service requirements  may  favour  service providers  over  the  service  users 
government is supposed to represent. 
 
Secondly, the very existence of public  intervention may generate a position externality, a monopoly 
rent that shall activate strategic behaviour by private partners, also known as “ rent seeking” . Fairly 
often  the  benefits  of  well-meaning,  state-sanctioned  protection  of  rent-generating  situations  are 
concentrated, whereas its costs are dispersed (or vice versa), raising obvious equity issues. In such 
cases the  benefit-cost  calculation can easily  get superseded  by the rational  willingness  to  spend 
resources  to  twist  the  decision.  Thus,  the  benefits  are  wasted  in  competition  (“ positional 
externality” ):  partial  remedies  may  be  partial  financing,  price-based  auctions  or  a  uniform 
distribution of transferable rights. 
 
Third,  the  issue  of  rent  seeking  may  get  intertwined  with  the  issue  of  adverse  selection  by 
unmodifiable features, e.g. when the equity or the protection motive are directed to existing firms  (a 
means) instead of people and their welfare (the  end). Alternative remedies to the risk of subsidising 
structurally  inefficient  firms  may  include  partial  financing,  compulsory  group  insurance  or 
assessment and statistical differentiation by objective criteria. 
 
Fourth,  the  state  itself  enjoys  market  power,  indeed  is  a  sort  of  monopolist  in  the  markets  for 
collective  decision-making  and  collective  actions.  As  such,  the  state  has  poor  incentives  to 
efficiency, above all in relation to time issues: NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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- decision-making processes may afford to be untimely, in contrast to the importance of “ time-to-
market”  for firms;  
- decision-makers may have an interest in  short-run policies over socially more appropriate long-run 
policies, in that the former yield visible results within the politically appropriate time horizon; 
- once decided upon,  rules are static objects  in  a dynamic  system: e.g.  antitrust  law  may prove 
inadequate  in front of the dynamics  of  innovation,  planning decisions may  outlive  their welfare 
justification, … ; 
-  conversely, governments can afford  time incoherence, i.e.  reneging on  previous  commitments: 
credible commitments often require independent authorities. 
 
Attempting a response to this situation, the Tiebout logic adopts the idea of competition in the public 
sector by introducing government tiers and favouring bottom-up subsidiarity. Apparently, the model 
obtains  responsive  and  efficient  local authorities  to  communities  with  homogeneous  preferences 
from the ability of the public to vote with the feet. However, others may argue (Mrs Thatcher did) 
that wasteful competition, both between and within government tiers, is the other face of competition 
and redundancy, resulting in excess financing of collective decision-making and consequently more 
constrained private decision-making. Besides, competition need not be the only behavioural  rule: 
cooperation  is possible  and  sometimes  desirable,  but  collusion is  the  other  face of cooperation, 
reducing transparency and restoring market power to the damage of outsiders, primarily the citizenry 
in this case. 
 
Fifth, and consequently, the issue of accountability: why should individuals delegate choices is not a 
once-for-all decision. More fundamentally, the widespread assumption of a benevolent and impartial 
dictator,  aiming at  social welfare  without  any own  goals,  is not  justified  in practice.  Individual 
interests may take precedence over the common good. Moral hazard and choice of ( hidden) action of 
the principal-agent type are real for public officials as well as private managers (Levinthal, 1988; 
Tirole,  1994).  Further,  the  problem  may  be  compounded  in  the  case  of  government-dependent 
agencies with  public  agency –   private firms  relationships,  since  the  monopolistic  setup  of  most 
agencies, by instrument or by territory; makes them easy to capture by lobbies (Morimort, 1996; 
Laffont, Morimort, 1998). Unlike in the market sector, hostile takeovers and/or organization closures 
are de facto impossible for governments, while output market competition is usually legislated away 
and performance-related rewards are hard to design, except for the electoral sanction (Pompili, 1996 
and 1998). What is left is good old command-and-control, in the form of corporate governance, with 
the usual free-riding risks as in private firms. 
 
Rent seeking, timing of decision-making, time incoherence, wasteful competition, collusion,  lack of 
accountability: all of these may provide economic reasons for governance, i.e. for an approach to 
governing the socio-economic system that takes into account the realities and limits of government. 
 
2.2. The network alternative 
 
We  mean  by  government  the  institutional  dimension  of  politics,  identifying a  coherent  form  of 
authority following a model of top-down hierarchical control. With respect to this, governance has 
shifted  from  an initial  stress  on process  to  a  new bottom-up  style of  government.  This  style  is 
characterised by cooperation and interaction among public and private actors within public-private 
decision-making networks marked by bargaining and renegotiation. The word “ public”  takes on a 
different meaning, shifting from electoral mandate to collective issue. A good general introduction to 
the issue of governance is Unesco (1998); recently, the themes of public-private partnerships and 
local development have been deepened in e.g. the papers collected by Chatrie, Uhaldeborde (1995). 
 
Neither State authority nor market competition seem to offer a fully satisfactory problem-solving 
framework: this presses the economic case for public-private cooperation, or networking. But  where 
is networking superior  to both market and State? Can we expect  networks to excel in balancing NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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market power, in creating missing markets, and in  redistributing resources and rewards? A theory of 
network efficiency is needed. 
 
As we shall see, with respect to the market, networks cannot offset market power failures, indeed 
they may favour new monopolies or collusive oligopolies. They do respond, however, to missing 
market failures, both of the information and of the externality type, and hold the potential to respond 
to the market outcome (equity)  failure - here, however, a  normative choice is needed for them to do 
so. 
 
With respect  to  the state,  networks tend  to  offset X-inefficiency and  free-riding,  especially in  a 
dynamic sense, but not rent-seeking, whose risk indeed increases, and accountability failures. 
 
2.2.1. Network externalities 
 
From the viewpoint of economic theory, this section builds u pon the work of, among others, Capello 
(1994), which deals with physical network externalities (telecommunications) but can be generalised 
to immaterial networks. 
 
In a network externality the value of a (physical) network to the user is highly dependent on the 
numbers of already existing users: the choice to become a user depends on it  (Rohlfs, 1974). Notice 
that what matters is the cost of joining, in terms of organisational changes and learning processes, 
which derives from  the behaviour  of other  individuals. On the  contrary,  the cost  of equipment 
(independent of others) does not matter, and is in any case not relevant for immaterial networks. 
Apart from receiving benefits from the network, new users generate benefits to other users of the 
network, who may engage in or receive further contacts. This in turn makes the network all the more 
appealing to outsiders. 
 
While on the demand side willingness-to-pay increases with the number of users, on the supply  side 
costs fall due to economies of  scale: contrary to standard  analysis, it would pay to wait. Thus, there 
cannot be an equilibrium outcome; initially, a public subsidy may be needed, until users exceed the 
self-sustaining threshold (Jonscher, 1983; Allen, 1988). 
 
Thus, according to the literature (see e.g. papers collected by Antonelli, 1992), the value of a network 
is positively affected by two elements, both accelerating adoption of the network technology (e.g. 
Saloner, Shepard, 1991). The former  is the number of locations it serves (“ network”  effect, less 
relevant for immaterial networks), and  the second  is the number of its users (“ production scale”  
effect). 
 
As usual, congestion may bring negative externalities. In physical networks it can be relieved by 
costly  additional  investment  in  network  infrastructure;  generally  speaking,  public  planning  and 
coordination may be required in order to ensure maximum growth benefits from physical networks 
(Schuler, 1992). 
 
Thus, the mechanism of interdependent preferences results in interrelation among decision-making 
processes  of  different  users.  Beyond  a  threshold,  it  generates  a  speedy  cumulative  process  in 
diffusion of the network technology (“ bandwagon”  effect): consumption externalities matter. The 
next step forward (Capello, 1994) is that networks also generate production network externalities 
affecting the competitiveness  of firms. In this way, this approach  can be employed in analysing 
networks between firms and local production systems: network need not be material. 
 
Insofar as networks provide greater benefits to users either for competition (from common assets) or 
for cooperation (vertical integration), they may be considered akin to public goods or club goods. NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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More precisely, networks are non-rival, i.e. allow for shared use, at least up to congestion, but they 
may be excludable, in order to avoid congestion or to achieve competitive advantages over outsiders. 
 
These benefits, in terms of information and of synergic linkages, translate into higher productivity, 
hence better economic performance for individuals and firms. If linkages are influenced by spatial 
proximity, as in local spillover effects and in the complementarity between telecommunications and 
face-to-face  contacts,  this  improved  performance  extends  to  regions.  Of  course,  actual  benefits 
depend on a twin assumption about individuals and firms vis-à-vis the network to which they have 
access (Capello, 1994). First, they  know (technical know-how, also on the specific usefulness of the 
network) and second they are able to  appropriate (organisational flexibility, entrepreneurship) its 
potential benefits. 
 
As for the distributive issue, benefits are distributed, broadly  speaking, according to this  knowledge 
and ability, but, at least in the case of physical networks, the owners of the network might extract 
benefits from the users, in the form of rents. This  may possibly take place to the point of making the 
position  of  users  only  marginally  better  than  the  position  of  non-users,  and  not  related  to  the 
contribution they make. Alternatively, and with the same effects, first-comers may limit the rewards 
of newcomers to  their advantage. Finally, if access to  the network may be excluded by insiders 
claiming congestion, this may amount to unfair competition, which is normally forbidden. 
 
On a more fundamental level, in all these cases the distributive  issue turns into the issue of the 
inefficiency of  egoism. Since egoism may  be destructive, altruists should  not disappear: relative 
payoffs from interaction determine the  equilibrium share of altruists where expecte d payoffs are the 
same. If they are  never the same, a  corner equilibrium occurs –  but if egoist/altruist identification is 
possible, the result is reversed for co-operators: the lower the cost of identification, the better the 
outcome. This is a new variant of prisoners’  dilemma: a story of lack of trust, rather than lack of 
communication, resulting in poorer outcomes unless credible commitments are made. 
 
Up to this point, we considered networks in a general sense, referring implicitly to individual and 
firms in economic space. However, an essential dimension of networks is that they are local: they are 
local, by definition, in a topological sense, but they can be local  in a geographical sense as well (see 
Section 3).  In so  far  as it implies repeated  exchanges, a  network  implies trust  and therefore  an 
environment endowed with social capital, strong  institutions and shared values –  which is indeed the 
case for local, intra-urban networks. 
 
2.2.2. From government to governance: urban networks 
 
Following prior US experience, also in Europe downsizing of the nation state and fragmentation of 
local  authorities  give  birth  to  a  sort  of  entrepreneurial  local  government.  This  is  spurred  by 
competition for public funds, private investment and highly skilled workforce (Le Galès, 1995 and 
1998). At the same time, between the  1970s and the 1990s, regional and urban policies shifted from 
hierarchical (institutions), normative (constraints) and sectoral approaches to strategic, consensus and 
integrated approaches. The shift of approach by policies strengthened local networks and their inter-
organisational forms (“ governance” ), for example in the shape of urban public-private partnerships 
(Camagni  and  Gibelli,  1994;  Camagni,  1995).  In  particular,  strategic  planning  is  an  arena  of 
competition  for  the  most  favourable  representation,  but  it  is  also  a  catalyst  of  cooperation  and 
relationships,  where  reciprocal  learning  and  viewpoint  sharing  occur:  learning  implies 
communication (Le Galès, 1997). 
 
A central condition for success in this context is the adequate local supply of social capital, as an 
untradeable  resource  located  neither  in  individuals  (human  capital)  nor  in  means  of  production 
(economic capital), but in the structure, density and stability of social relationships (Ercole, 2000). 
Through it, information and trust become available and make individual goals attainable, although it NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for  local development (Trigilia, 1999). Even in depressed 
areas, a combination of symbolic capital of external investment with parts of local networks of social 
capital can reinvigorate the regional economy (Uhlir, 1998). However, opening local networks to 
external actors may make the network strive for excellence, bur weaken its trust relationships. 
 
Urban governance networks may provide several advantages over traditional government modes: 
- from wasteful competition and strategic rent seeking among private decision-makers for  scarce 
public  resources  to  truthful  cooperation  among  stakeholders  to  achieve  the  most  efficient  and 
productive use of those resources; 
- greater effectiveness, in so far as integration means many actions all aiming at one joint public goal, 
also thanks to a public guarantee of equitable distribution of benefits and/or costs; 
- better timing of decision-making (work by objectives is more efficient than work by procedures), 
longer policy horizons (short run political rewards come from the network operation itself), greater 
flexibility over time (“ what the law does not forbid it allows”  is more efficient than “ what the law 
does not allow it forbids” ), lower risk of time incoherence (the network is a repeated game); 
- cross control between principals in the name of the agents’  interest improves accountability ex ante; 
indeed, preferences may be better known through these multiple channels. 
 
The cost, in terms both of learning and of organisational change and above all of transaction cost, of 
joining an urban governance network is low, whereas in inter-city networks it is high, as we shall 
see.  Therefore,  the  public  subsidy  needed  to  set  up  the  network  until  it  goes  beyond  the  self-
sustaining threshold may be very small and short -lived: a low-cost and high-efficiency way to signal 
a credible commitment by the public sector. Moreover, since  the number of urban actors is generally 
limited, urban governance networks do not run a risk of congestion if too many join, in contrast to 
private networks. 
 
Nevertheless, urban governance networks do seem to perpetuate some government problems and add 
new ones: 
- the distribution of benefits and costs may take the well-known form of private benefits and public 
costs, leaving to the public sector only benefits of the symbolic, “ image”  type; 
- internalisation of strategic behaviour may in fact worsen the timeliness of decisions, let alone block 
them, even though it should help in the implementation phase; 
- as usual in strategic contexts, networks have a problem of actors’ credibility in commitments; more 
precisely, whereas commitments to act can easily be monitored, commitments not to act are indeed 
problematic; 
- principals in one single network may favour collusion against the agents, in an exchange between 
private capture of the public regulator and cooperation as a way to avoid being accountable to the 
ultimate agent, the citizenry. 
 
Despite  these  difficulties,  in  the  real  world  there  appears  to  be  no  governance  failure:  which 
theoretical mechanisms are at work in preventing network failure to be the positive end result? 
 
An empirical outcome is that success tends to occur only in presence of a leader: this implies a sunk 
commitment, but not in a threat sense. Investing in something and disinvesting in something else, 
means that reverting to the “ start box”  is costly: this actor has an incentive to step forward, other 
actors are signalled that this actor does have  such a credible incentive. The difficulty lies in starting 
the mechanism, since afterwards it is a cumulative path: here is a role for government institutions. 
 
Alternatively, benefits  are so large that cooperation, and  not tit for tat, is the dominant strategy, 
although distribution conflicts might take place. If actors are already specialised, then comparative 
advantage is apparent to each and every one, and  equally obvious is the division of labour to be 
agreed upon,  with the  ensuing distribution  of most,  if not all, benefits and  compensatory cross-
payments. NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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Local networks and their inter-organisational forms (“ governance” ) were strengthened to the point of 
“ governing without government” , thus raising issues of democratic accountability of decision-makers 
(Rhodes, 1996), especially if one adheres to the idea of democracy as formality and rules (Kelsen). In 
the end, the question is whether public-private governance is the freedom of cities or the victory of 
the market mechanism even in the public realm. On one hand, firms are increasingly part of and 
dependent on a governance action, from which their behaviour cannot be separately evaluated. On 
the other, most individuals feel  little represented in the decision-making arena and cannot vote with 
their feet: they may simply give up voting, leading to elitism/technocracy (Perulli, 2000). 
 
In fact,  within a  principal-agent  approach  (Arrow,  1985;  Hart and  Holmstrom,  1987;  Levinthal, 
1988; Tirole, 1994), the local population, i.e. citizens, taxpayers, employees, and self -employed, can 
be  seen  as  the  principal  in  a  model  where  private  and  public  decision-makers,  i.e.  employers, 
landowners, developers, local authority politicians and bureaucrats, are the agents (Pompili, 1996). 
 
The population decentralises decision-making because of specialisation advantages: these increase 
with city size, also because of the increasing complexity of collective urban problems. At the same 
time,  though,  the  information  problem  arises  in  the  city/region:  the  population  is  not  as  fully 
informed as its decision-makers. This is a problem because the latter cannot be relied upon as having 
the same goals as the population, thus raising the issue of the correct (for principals) incentives to 
agents. 
 
The  traditional  approach  assumed,  first,  that  only  public  decision-making  is  relevant  to  the 
population and, second, that a rigid control on public decision-makers (“ accountability” ) was feasible 
and carried credible penalties or at least that public ethics, i.e. the internalisation of control, was 
widespread among decision-makers. Such assumptions can be invalidated, e.g. by electoral systems 
inhibiting clear-cut and stable majorities and by hardening public finance constraints. The theo retical 
problem is made more serious by the fact that such agents both have a wide scope for decision-
making and are very difficult to control. Thus, both a partnership and a principal-agent approach may 
have limited effect when public ethics is low (public: not just public sector!). 
 
 
3. CITIES AS (COLLECTIVE) ECONOMIC ACTORS 
 
Viewing cities as unitary, albeit collective, actors  in a network is not an obvious step in economics, 
since this discipline is grounded in methodological individualism. This means that it is perfectly 
reasonable to accept organisations, be they firms or institutions, as actors or decision -makers, in that 
they  are  characterised  by  a  decision-making  body  which  has  the  authority  to  see  its  decisions 
implemented. Economic analysis has questioned the assumption of the effectiveness of command-
and-control,  delving  into  the  internal  workings  of  organisations.  Yet,  to  many  purposes  the 
assumption is reasonable. What seems far less reasonable is to assume that a collective entity without 
even a governing body with accepted authority may be  a decision -making actor. Therefore, it has to 
be shown that cities are indeed unitary entities before their networking activities can be analysed. 
 
A preliminary difficulty to be dispelled is that different  meanings of cities are  implied in the debate. 
Physical definitions of the city as built-up area, of course, have no meaning in terms of decision-
making analysis: they set the scene for actions but do not provide an actor. In the same vein, if the 
city is just  a locationally-based aggregate of individual actors, than  it is no decision-maker in itself: 
what outcomes  we  relate to  the city  are  just  a  convenient  sum  total of  individually determined 
outcomes. 
 
If there is to be something to the idea of the city  as a unitary economic actor, local individual actors, 
i.e. citizens, taxpayers, employees, and self-employed, may at best be the principals, whereas private NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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and public decision-makers qualifying as strategic agents (Pompili, 1996) remain to be identified: 
public administration, social institutions, stakeholders, … : in any case aggregate collective actors.  
 
The first meaning is the city as one political or administrative institution: political leaders and the 
bodies where they sit might be taken as the city’ s decision-maker. After all, being democratically 
elected by the resident population, they do have legitimacy, but they do not have the power to direct 
individual private decisions and actions, except in few well-delimited fields. 
 
A second meaning is the city as a structured society: civic leaders and the circles where they meet 
might then be taken as the city’ s decision-maker. Such leaders have a functional legitimacy, and their 
individual decisions, or lack thereof, are very influential in terms of impa cts. However, they have no 
democratic legitimacy and in fact no power at all to direct individual decisions and actions. 
 
A third, broader meaning is based on the concept of stakeholders. It has the advantage of stressing 
that the resident population endowed with voting rights is not the only group with an interest in the 
city, the only principal, as employees, firms, and city users in general also have a legitimate interest. 
However,  this may  blur  the distinction  between  principals and  agents,  the  latter  being  the  ones 
directly responsible for those decisions with far-reaching, city-wide consequences. 
 
It is generally accepted that individual welfare depends on both individual decisions and the fallout 
of actions of other, independent individuals; additionally, here we argue that they depend also on 
decisions and actions of representative private and public institutions whose leaders are somehow 
chosen by individuals themselves. 
 
If the city is merely an aggregate of individual decision-makers, then it may not need an analysis 
specifically centred on this aggregate, unless the end result of atomistic  individual actions is inferior 
to the optimal result the city might obtain. This  gap between the “market”  outcome and the “social”  
outcome may be viewed as the value added by the city as an entity in itself. 
 
This gap may or may not occur depending on the existence and functioning of intra -urban networks: 
the city’ s value added is a positive externality to each individual decision-maker –  and might be 
produced in the optimal amount only after a commitment of resources by individual decision-makers. 
Because of the high transaction costs in an atomistic city, this commitment is unlikely to occur. 
 
Prospects  may be  better  in the  case of a  city  including both  individuals and  private and  public 
institutions. Strategic, influential decisions are taken by these institutions, and their limited numbers 
allow for much lower transaction costs. Urban networks are likely to be in place. However, even if 
the city is just a byword for its public and private institutions, the individual organisational objectives 
that  guide  the actions of  these  institutions may  still differ  from  the “ common  good” .  This may 
happen  either  because  institutions prefer  to  behave in  an  atomistic,  un-coordinated  way, due  to 
negligible benefits of cooperation net of costs, or because institutions are unable to agree on joint 
action, due to conflicting goals i.e. distributional issues. 
 
Thus, intra-urban networking activity is a necessary condition for the identification of the city as a 
purposeful  actor  and  decision-maker.  But  this  activity  requires  significant  payoffs  both  on  the 
aggregate and in distributive terms.  
 
3.1. Collective actors as individual actors 
 
We believe that cities can be analysed as unita ry economic decision-makers in so far as they  can be 
shown: 
- to share collective interests, 
- to exploit collective resources, and NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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- to undertake collective actions. 
In all of these instances, the term collective is taken to mean that it cannot be derived simply as 
aggregate outcomes of individual interests, resources and actions. 
 
First, cities, and individual decision-makers within them, do have collective interests and goals, as 
reflected  in  a  collective  welfare  function.  To  design  this  function  they  elicit  the  revelation  of 
collective preferences, via electoral competition but also via networking among local institutions and 
stakeholders. In a positive sense, decision makers do have in mind a collective welfare function when 
they undertake competitiveness policies and “ foreign”  policy. 
 
These collective interests do not simply depend on individual interests because individual interests 
may be in reciprocal conflict and  cancel out,  either because of competition or because being on 
different sides of the market. General, common collective interests are external to individual interests 
in that they set the context: rules of the game (locally, the game of using local resources), extent of 
the market, certainty of future purchasing power,   …  (Camagni, 1989). On the other hand, these are 
not  the sole  goals of  public institutions,  which may  have their  own  organisational  interests  and 
therefore be agents for their principal: the distinction seems necessary to justify a network approach. 
 
Traditionally, welfare is measured by utility and/or profit; refinements may include measurement 
over a longer run and by capital  values (for ownership) instead of current values (for use). However, 
if collective welfare is more than the sum total of individual welfare levels, we need an additional 
measure for it, complementary to utility / profit. This measure may equate with measures of: 
- attractiveness for people and firms, hence the direction of absolute dynamics, but also its cumulated 
size, by any indicator; the latter is also valuable as a proxy of the diversification of opportunities; 
-  stability of  its patterns  of  change (e.g.  growth without  fluctuations) i.e.  with  a  low  degree  of 
uncertainty  about  the  future;  here  again  aggregate  uncertainty  is  not  the  sum  of  micro-level 
uncertainties, because these often cancel each other out . 
 
Second,  cities  may  draw  from  collective  resources,  apart  from  and  in  addition  to  individual 
resources. Their difference from the pool of individual resources lies in both their common use or 
joint use and/or in their origin from interaction. 
 
One way to look at them is as localised assets, meaning specific  resources: both physical resources, 
valuable  as  specific  production  inputs,  and  accumulated  human  resources  (know-how),  giving 
specific comparative advantage to locally active producers as a group (Camagni, 1999). Another way 
to look at collective resources is as “ espace de soutien”  (Ratti), meaning common goods yielding 
externalities:  common  infrastructure,  needed  as  general  production  inputs,  and  general  human 
resources. Here, again, the network concept comes to mind. 
 
The existence of such resources provides an opportunity to put them to use, through a technology 
transforming  these  resources  into  means  to  the  achievement  of  objectives.  The  city  as  such  is 
responsible for their creation, maintenance and development, together with the general willingness 
and ability to exploit them (Vazquez Barquero, 1999). Public institutions are an important actor in 
this respect, but by no means the only one, unl ess we assume a perfect ability both to know what the 
city’ s interests are and to harness resources to pursue those interests. 
 
Third, in order to move from preferences to actions, cities, and individual decision-makers within 
them, do undertake collective actions, apart from the actions of local public institutions, for public 
goods, also via networking (Malecki, 2002). 
 
Within  firms,  operatives  implement  the  managers’   decisions;  likewise, strategic  decision-makers 
(especially public ones) might wish to  see their choices to  be followed through. But  the city as 
network has no hierarchical authority, nor binding contracts, nor credible sanctions, neither among NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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decision-makers  nor  between  institutions  and  individuals.  In  so  far  as  they  provide  positive 
externalities, these  actions  may  not  provide  sufficient  incentives for  individual or organisational 
action. 
 
Therefore, whereas we may hold a general presumption that the market mechanism does work, no 
market mechanism can work in the context we are dealing with,  if decisions are not sequential. Then 
both a credibility and a free-riding problem arise, and in order to offset both, public  institutions may 
play a decisive role as the first to commit  resources for credibility. 
 
In this sense a city is a unitary decision-maker: co-ordinated action is unthinkable merely as a set of 
individual actions. Collective action may therefore be thought of as a non-market mechanism for 
microeconomic agents’  coordination. 
 
3.2. Mobile and immobile actors 
 
Under these conditions of effective internal networking, then, every city can be viewed as a unitary 
decision-maker in the market for global locational choices. In this market, territories, i.e. networks of 
localised decision-makers, supply localised resources to mobile decision-makers (Head, Ries, 1996). 
 
Mobile actors are willing and able to pursue their objectives also by making locational choices that 
increase  their  competitiveness  and  therefore  their  rewards.  Instances  of  such  actors  are  multi-
localised  firms,  up  to  trans-national  corporations,  international  or  global  organizations  and 
institutions, but also individual owners of significant amounts of human capital. 
 
On  the  contrary,  the  above  description  of  the  market  implies  that  communities  are  local  and 
immobile. It is not established whether this is a positive issue, depending on the cost of moving (not 
just monetary cost), or a normative one. In so far as most individuals do not consider mobility an 
attractive option for themselves, they have an interest in local externali ties attracting opportunities to 
their location, and therefore they share an  interest in organising into urban networks in order  to 
create, develop or maintain those externalities. 
 
From a different viewpoint, positive (non-policy) economic analysis of the system of cities provides 
different interpretive models to explain system patterns as hierarchical, diversified or complementary 
(Pumain, 1992). Against the background of classical urban system models, we stress the novelty of 
the “ reticolo”  paradigm, developed in both economic geography and urban economics in the 1980s 
(Dematteis, 1980s;  Camagni and Salone, 1993). The aim of this paradigm was to  find territorial 
competitive advantages not linked to size and  scale (cfr. Christaller): network externalities, spurring 
synergy networks, and division of labour, spurring complementarity networks. 
 
All these models, however, view the city as one  economic decision-maker competing with other 
cities,  choosing  economic  specialisations  and  urban  functions  (Camagni,  DeBlasio,  1993). 
Nevertheless, within this approach cities self-organise –  but also the system of cities self-organises, 
apparently without the need of purposeful action; as a partial exception, innovative milieux theory 
does stress the purposeful aspect more than other theories. 
 
As a matter of fact, purposeful inter -city/regional competition for private and public resources is the 
basis of competition for urban functions. As such it highlights the role of markets as the efficient 
choice institution for allocating scarce non-local resources within and between regional/city ranks at 
both the national/regional and  the international/continental  level. Nevertheless, since  markets are 
risky ventures, under specific conditions cities may also purposefully choose to  cooperate in order to 
increase their own welfare or to reduce future risks concerning it. 
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4. EFFICIENCY OF INTER-CITY NETWORKS 
 
Internationalised economic competition and new communication technologies are often thought to 
lead,  if  unfettered,  to  excess  concentration  (Graham,  1999).  Rather,  they  seem  to  change  the 
organization  of  production  both  in  manufacturing-technological  cities  and  in  service-diversified 
cities  (Buisson,  Rosier,  1998).  In fact,  urban  structure  is  increasingly  characterised  by multiple 
centres,  where  the  interplay  of  agglomerative  and  dispersive  forces  leads  to  multiple and  path-
dependent equilibria –  with persistent inefficiencies (Anas et al., 1998). In particular, the historical 
and current role of the nation state in providing rules and physical networks has an impact on the 
system of cities (Cattan, 1995). 
 
The growing extension of urban phenomena and network society leads to opportunities and risks in 
different territories, which can be viewed as networks of (urban) networks (Shin , Timberlake, 2000). 
From these opportunities and risks and a dynamic view of territory, while citizens exhibit multi-level 
and/or  shifting loyalties,  new  territorial  models  of  government develop.  These models  focus  on 
cooperation  among  local  agents (“ governance” ),  among  levels of  government,  and  among  cities 
(Arndt et al., 2000). 
 
4.1. Inter-city competition vs. network cooperation 
 
If cities are unitary decision-makers indeed, then almost by definition they compete, since territories 
cannot take anything for granted when they face mobile actors making locational choices. As we said 
above, purposeful inter-city competition for private and public resources is the basis of competition 
for urban functions. As such it highlights the role of markets as the efficient choice institution for 
allocating scarce resources. 
 
Nevertheless, it is often lamented that there is a risk of destructive or wasteful competition in the 
market  for  global  locational  choices.  More  precisely,  a  short  run  situation  may  arise  where 
monopsony is the market form analogy: several competing territories facing one mobile decision-
maker. The location decision is then taken at the lowest “ price” , so that the distribution of surplus / 
benefits is fully skewed in favour of the mobile decision-maker. 
 
In the short run the main instrument for territorial competition is financial and fiscal incentives to the 
use of local resources, but also the waiving of  rights and rules for newcomers. In the long run, 
though, we might argue that short run winners would become congested and therefore compensate 
greater benefits with greater costs: consequently, no policy limiting free competition would  seem to 
be warranted. Different types of mobile decision-makers will find their preferred mix of locational 
benefits and costs, in a large scale revival of Tiebout’ s model. However, this shall be true at the 
margin but, since it will occur after a larger size is cumulatively attained, increasing opportunities 
and reducing risks, it will just stop a process of increasing collective welfare, not reverse it. 
 
Still,  it  might  be  argued  that  this  competition  merely  shifts  benefits  among  territories,  without 
generating  any,  and  that  this  comes  with  a  greater  cost  on  immobile  actors.  Then,  the  social 
advantage of competition over cooperation, for the global system of territories, might not materialise, 
competition  being  a  zero-sum  game.  This  is  not  the  case,  if  and  when  competition  stimulates 
territorial efficiency, especially in a dynamic sense, which happens when any measures being taken 
benefit  also  local  firms.  However,  the  game  turns  out  to  be  zero-sum,  if  and  when  inter-city 
competition  merely  diverts  choices,  which  happens  when  measures  benefit  only  incomers.  This 
creates a positional externality game which is wasteful in that it uses up resources to no aggregate 
benefit increase. 
 
Once more, the bottom line is the typical liberal call for general rules and transparent actions (e.g. 
explicit strategic planning) and against specific privileges. This call may be in the genera l interest of NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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cities,  but each city may  have  an  incentive  in seeing  it  heeded by other  cities while remaining 
unbound by it. Therefore, this condition should be set at the “ constitutional”  level, or by an upper-tier 
public authority, such as the nation state or the European Union. 
 
Additionally, in the face of short run waste of resources and of purely diversionary (redistributive) 
effects, cooperation is a superior mode of organisation. The normative conclusion may then be a call 
for inter-urban diplomacy and commitments, namely inter-city networks, in a bid to avoid “ unfair”  
competition and to support the spatial division of  labour. In other words, following the market  form 
analogy, the normative conclusion is to substitute bilateral monopoly for monopsony. 
 
This goal may be achieved either through building complementarity networks or through building 
synergy networks. In the former case specific mobile decision-makers face only one or very few 
territories willing to  host them, in the latter mobile decision-makers face one unified network of 
territories.  The  system,  as  a  regional  complementarity  network  or  as  a  super-regional  synergy 
network, shall supply localised resources to mobile decision-makers. Both these strategies provide 
additional benefits to  cities,  in that  they work  also in favour  of the competitiveness of existing, 
already localised firms and individuals. 
 
In a bilateral monopoly, then, the well-known equilibrium result is indeterminate, both in terms of 
the number of movements but  above all in terms of the price paid for them and  the consequent 
distribution  of  benefits  between  mobile  and  immobile  actors.  From  the  territorial  viewpoint  of 
immobile actors, this appears as an improvement over the monopsonistic situation, and so does from 
the general, or social, viewpoint. 
 
4.2. Why the rise of policy networks? 
 
Since the market for global locational choices is a risky allocation venture, and inter-city competition 
may subject it to monopsony by mobile decision -makers, cities do have an incentive to cooperate in 
the form of regional complementarity or super-regional synergy networks in order to: 
- reduce costs associated with competition to attract mobile decision makers (positional externality); 
- increase their own share of non-local resources, as a group (w.r.t. other cities); 
- increase their share of the rewards associated with hosting mobile decision-makers (w.r.t. them); 
- free resources to be devoted to local decision-makers (as well as to mobile incomers); 
- reduce inter-jurisdictional conflicts, by distributing growth and its rewards ex ante more equitably 
(within the group). 
 
An additional economic justification for the rise of inter-city policy networks is related to the fixity 
of administrative boundaries and of competence assignments. Over time, the economic boundaries of 
a  city  are  mobile,  responding  to  changes  in  transport  and  communication  technologies  and 
infrastructures:  the  resident  population  (voters)  and  city  users  (stakeholders)  do  not  necessarily 
coincide.  Moreover,  de  facto  public  service  catchment  areas  may  not  adhere  to  administrative 
boundaries, generating inter-jurisdictional spillovers, or may be forced into inefficient boundaries  to 
buttress the existence of plural governments. 
 
Internalisation of these externalities via consolidation of local governments into one, or via transfer 
of  competences  to  the  upper  tier,  is  a  solution  (Mansoorian,  Myers,  1996).  However,  plurality 
provides incentives to efficiency and to accountability of governments: both properties are supported 
by the  vertical division of competences (“ specialisation” ),  and  by the  horizontal competition  for 
service  users  and  for  funds  (“ redundancy” ).  These  incentives  can  be  preserved  only  within  a 
federalist framework. 
 
Short of consolidation and of competence transfer, the solution to these externality problems may lie 
in cooperation i.e. in the creation of both multi-level and horizontal institutional networks. In the NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
  16
former case these institutional networks ensure coordination both locally and towards outside pol icy-
makers, ensuring several formal independent actions towards the same one goal; in the latter they 
remedy or compensate spillovers and serve for both advocacy and information purposes. 
 
Thus, by and large, inter-city governance networks may provide several advantages over traditional 
government modes, although less markedly so than urban networks, and over atomistic city action: 
- from wasteful competition and strategic rent seeking among cities for scarce public resources to 
truthful cooperation to achieve the most efficient and productive use of those resources in a region or 
in a type of cities; 
- greater effectiveness, in so far as network integration means many local actions all aiming at one 
common goal; 
- longer policy horizons (short run political rewards come from visibility of the network operation 
itself), lower risk of time incoherence (the network is a repeated game); 
- cross control among cities in the name of the population’ s interest improves accountability ex ante. 
We assume that benefits are fully gained when public actors exchange feed -back with the rest of the 
city via public-private partnerships and via strategic territorial planning. 
 
If  a  condition  for  network  success  is  that  an  actor  makes  a  costly  sunk  commitment  and  is 
consequently  accepted  as  a  credible  leader  by  other  prospective  actors,  this  condition  is  more 
difficult in the case of inter-city networks, where no city substantially differs from others (compare 
with local public institutions vis-à-vis private decision-makers). Here is a likely role for upper-tier 
government institutions, a point that should be expected to make regional complementarity networks 
easier to establish (top-down) than synergy networks. 
 
However, the cost, in terms of learning processes and of organisational change, of joining an inter-
city network  is high, higher than  for urban networks. Therefore, a  high and  persistent top-down 
public  subsidy  and  commitment  by  an  upper-tier  government  is  needed  not  only  to  set  up  the 
network, but also to overcome the cost of joining and to achieve the self-sustaining threshold, unless 
expected benefits are correspondingly high. 
 
Insofar as networks provide greater competitive advantages to member cities over outsiders, either 
for  competition  (from  common  assets)  or  for  cooperation  (vertical  integration),  they  may  be 
considered  akin  to  club  goods.  These  competitive  advantages  translate  into  potentially  better 
economic  performance  for  local individuals  and  firms.  Knowledge  of  and  ability to  appropriate 
benefits will also determine their distribution among partners sharing use of the  network, which will 
have the incentive and the ability to exclude outsiders from access to it. 
 
In contrast to urban networks, inter-city networks may easily run a risk of congestion if too many 
join. Even if a network of cities is justified, many potential joiners chase smaller, incremental net 
benefits: intercity networks should be expected to be more exclusionary because of smaller benefits 
and higher transaction costs. 
 
Finally, trust is needed for the repeated exchanges occurring within a network, which calls for a 
common ground and reciprocal knowledge among partners. In this respect,  complementary networks 
are geographically local and synergy networks are topologically local, although in both cases shared 
values and trust are smaller than for urban networks. 
 
Therefore, the diplomacy of agreements to take and not to take actions suffers from a credibility 
problem due to the appeal of time incoherence, especially with restraint agreements. Full y voluntary 
inter-city networks may then prove unsustainable over time. In fact, in the real world we may find: 
- implicit agreements, when both final net benefits and initial comparative advantages are obvious to 
all parties; NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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- voluntary agreements, when final net benefits are obvious but initial comparative advantages are 
not; 
- enforced or statutory agreements, when no agreement would be reached because neither benefits 
nor advantages are obvious –  in this case an upper-tier government may want to force an agreement –  
but “ picking the winners”  is an impossible task. 
 
4.3. The costs of policy networks 
 
Again, governance may suffer pitfalls also at the inter-city level; some of these are related to the 
efficient and effective functioning of the network, and others are related to the impact of the network 
on the broader system: 
- inter-city policy networks may hinder the goal of competitive assignment of resources; 
- networking may not be an efficient decision-making tool; 
- cooperation may be a way for decision-makers to collude and avoid being accountable. 
 
First, with respect to a competitive market for global locational choices, although inter -city networks 
respond to monopsony risks, they may favour new monopolies or collusive oligopolies and, far from 
offsetting it, increase the risk do not offset rent-seeking from upper bodies. 
 
The very existence of a distribution of resources by an upper-tier authority may generate a position 
externality, a monopoly rent that shall activate the willingness by cities to  spend resources to seek it. 
Thus,  the  global  benefits  are  wasted  either  in  competition  among  cities  and  among  networks, 
wasteful competition being the other face of competition and redundancy, or via adverse selection, 
e.g. when the equity or the protection motive for aid are directed to the cities (a means) instead of 
people and their welfare (the end). 
 
By reducing competition among cities, inter-city networks enjoy market power, indeed are a sort of 
monopolist or cartel in the markets for collective decision-making and collective actions. As such, 
just like the state they may have poor incentives to efficiency, above all in relation to time issues and 
on issues of wasteful competition against other networks. 
 
If  networks’   success  depend  on  cumulative  lobbying  ability,  networks  have  purely diversionary 
(redistributive)  effects  on  financial  and  locational  choices,  and  it  is  arguable  whether  network 
economies of scale or increasing willingness to pay  are significant: rather then networks, these may 
be collusion agreements. 
 
Second,  networks  may  not  be  an  efficient  decision-making  tool:  costs  of  cooperation  are  not 
negligible  and  coordination  failures  and  strategic  behaviour  against cooperation  may  take  place 
within the network. 
 
The cost, in terms both of learning and of organisational change and above all of transaction cost, of 
joining an inter-city policy network is high, starting from a smaller common ground of values and 
trust. Therefore, the public subsidy needed to set up the network may be significant and permanent: a 
costly way to signal a credible commitment by the  upper-tier government, that may not be worth the 
benefit of  lesser wasteful  competition  and/or  more  timely decision-making.  Moreover,  since the 
number  of  cities  is  not  limited  a  priori,  inter-city  governance  networks  quickly  run  a  risk  of 
congestion. 
 
Moreover, partners may have joined for different reasons and expect different outcomes from the 
network:  plurality  of  goals  may  result  in  coordination  failures,  especially  if  the  number  of 
instruments or actions is too low to accommodate all of them.  
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Further,  network partners may  have joined for  symbolic reasons without  real commitment to  its 
success: active, pushed, hostile partners adopt different strategic behaviours, including rent-seeking, 
and  sabotaging  cooperation  within  the  network  (Santangelo,  2000;  Governa,  1997).  Thus, 
internalisation of strategic behaviour may in fact worsen the timeliness of decisions, let alone block 
them 
 
Finally,  as  usual  in  strategic  contexts,  networks  have  a  problem  of  actors’   credibility  in 
commitments; more precisely, whereas commitments to act can easily be monitored, commitments 
not to act are indeed problematic. Each city may have an incentives in breaking agreements while 
other cities uphold them 
 
Third, cooperation may turn into collusion, a way for decision-making principals to  avoid being 
accountable to their delegating agents. 
 
The accountability issue, already present in a realistic view of government (Pompili, 1996 and 1998), 
is exacerbated in the case of public-private networks, seen as monopolistic government-dependent 
agencies  with  public  agency  –   private  firms  relationships  (Morimort,  1996;  Laffont,  Morimort, 
1998). 
 
In networks, and more so in inter-city networks that are even more removed from the principals’  
attention, individual interests may take precedence over the common good, capturing the network. 
The accountability issue thus links with the equity issue, both within cities belonging to the network 
and  between  network  insiders  and  outsiders:  unfair  competition  against  excluded  “ lobbies”   or 
legitimate interest-bearers is worse than under traditional government. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION:  PULLING THE THREADS 
 
We essay to present and briefly discuss the theoretical economic rationale of networks as a p aradigm 
for urban development and governance (Camagni, 1993). Essentially, networks are the organisational 
manifestation of cooperative behaviour, as a distinct form from competition (market) and command 
(hierarchy).  
 
The issue of the network paradigm is a cost-benefit issue: networks are not an all-purpose recipe. The 
contexts in which cooperative behaviour prevails, and therefore human interaction is organised in 
networks, are determined by efficiency-based comparative advantage of these forms –  the advantage 
of  cooperation  depending  on  the  amount  of  externalities  and  development  opportunities  this 
governance device can ensure. In a positive sense, networks will occur and be productive where 
stakes are high and individual failure is very likely. 
 
We have discussed the above from the perspective of cities, focusing on intra-urban networks and on 
inter-city networks; in the latter case, we justified our stance of taking cities as collective actors. We 
think that this rationale may be a fruitful background  to studies aiming at the specific empirical 
content  of  networks  (Capello,  2000)  as  well  as  for  designing  and  evaluating  policy  initiatives 
(Batterbury et al., 1999).  
 
From a normative viewpoint, upper-tier public authorities, such as the nation state or the European 
Union, should: 
- set general rules and transparent actions and against specific privileges in inter-city competition; 
- require networks only where individual action is likely to fail, rather than to simplify their own 
decision-making processes; 
- supply financial support only under competitive or auction procedures and as partial financing to 
people for actual implementation, rather than to organisations for planning ability. NETWORKS WITHIN CITIES AND AMONG CITIES  (T. Pompili) 
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